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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
revesting in the distributor. Therefore, it is necessary to apply, as
this court did, Section 2-403, conferring full rights on Williams as though
the wholesaler had good title.
Another noteworthy facet of the present case is the court's ap-
plication of the cited section referring to "buyer in ordinary course" to
a transaction between two dealers rather than to the usual retail sale.]
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS,
CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CHATTEL PAPER
SECTION 9-104. Transactions Excluded From Article
This Article does not apply „
(d) to a transfer of a claim for wages, salary or other compensation
of an employee;
Opinion of the Justices, 173 A.2d 578 (N.H. 1961).
In answering a question propounded to them by the Governor and
Executive Council, the Justices of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
opined that the State was not bound to honor assignments of wages of
state employees or officials, and that the Governor and Council could
not honor such wage assignments in their discretion.
The conclusion was reached on the basis that there is no existing
legislation in New Hampshire authorizing such assignments. The court
noted as significant that Section 9-104(d) excludes such assignments
from the Code and leaves the solution open to local regulation.
SECTION 9-110. Sufficiency of Description
For the purpose of this Article any description of personal property or
real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies
what is described.
Attorney General's Opinion, No. 60-425, Ky., May 31, 1960.
See Section 9-402(1) infra, for a discussion of this opinion.
SECTION 9-203. Enforceability of Secured Interest; Proceeds, For-
mal Requisites
(1) . . . a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties unless .. .
(b) the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral . . . .
Mertz Estate, 24 D.&C.2d 587 (Pa. 1961).
Decedent in his lifetime executed a judgment note and delivered a
certificate of title to a truck with a lien noted thereon in favor of the
judgment creditor. Petitioner on behalf of the estate sought to recover
the certificate of title on the ground that no written security agreement
had been executed as required by the cited section. HELD: Petition
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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dismissed. The notation of the lien upon the certificate of title, pursuant
to the vehicle Code of Pennsylvania, is a method of creating liens with-
out transfering possession. It is also a sufficient writing to satisfy
this Statute of Frauds section of the Code. Under these circumstances
it is inequitable to deny that a security interest exists.
[Annotator's Comment: There is no indication from the opinion
that the debtor here signed his name to the lien noted upon the certifi-
cate of title. Although the court advances equitable grounds for its
decision, such grounds do not justify the avoidance of the specific
requirement of the Code that the security agreement be signed.]
SECTION 9-307. Protection of Buyers of Goods
(I) A buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
Taylor Motor Rental, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp., Inc., 173 A.2d
688 (Pa. 1961).
[N.B. This case was decided under the 1953 draft of the Code,
Section 9-307 of which read: "In the case of inventory ... a buyer in
ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest even though
perfected and even though the buyer knows of the terms of the security
agreement."]
See Section 1-201 supra, for a discussion of this case.
SECTION 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement; Amend-
ments
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and
the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which informa-
tion concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address
of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing
the items, of collateral. . .. When the financing statement covers crops
growing or to be grown or goods which are or are to become fixtures, the
statement must also contain a description of the real estate concerned.
Attorney General's Opinion, No. 60-695, Ky., July 18, 1960.
An instrument covering tobacco which describes it as "grown on
the farm of C. H. Jones in West Allen County near Claire" is a suffi-
cient description of the real estate involved. The Attorney General
relied upon Kentucky case Iaw in concluding that "description" means
a general description of the property sufficient for identification.
[Annotator's Comment: By seemingly relying only upon Kentucky
case law, the Attorney General has neglected to use the express in-
terpretative assistance provided by the Code in Section 9-110. Sec-
tion 9-110 provides that a "description of personal property or real
estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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what is described." Under this liberal test (far removed from the
"serial number" test, according to the Comment), the same result would
be reached in the Attorney General's example.]
Attorney General's Opinion, No. 60-425, Ky., May 31, 1960.
The Code would indicate that it is necessary to file an individual
financing statement for each trust receipt in order to perfect a security
interest in the goods covered. However, it is not necessary, although
it may be an additional precautionary measure, to file in addition a gen-
eral statement covering all the goods involved.
[Annotator's Comment: Nothing in the Code warrants the con-
clusion that a financing statement must be filed for each trust receipt.
Comment 2 to Section 9-402 points out that the Code is adopting the
simplified "notice filing" system of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,
under which, in a continuing arrangement, a general statement of intent
to engage in trust receipt financing in regard to the inventory of a
particular place of business (or a similar reasonable identification) is
sufficient. The Code is not regressing to the more stringent require-
ments of earlier chattel mortgage and conditional sales acts.]
SECTION 9-403. 'What Constitutes Filing; Duration of Filing; Effect
of Lapsed Filing; Duties of Filing Officer
(4) A filing officer shall mark each statement with a consecutive file
number and with the date and hour of filing and shall hold the statement
for public inspection. .. .
Attorney General's Opinion, No. 60-695, Ky., July 18, 1960.
The county clerk or filing officer must determine whether the financ-
ing statement contains substantially the information required by the
Code, but he "has no authority to go behind the instrument" in making
his determination. However, there is no penalty imposed on the clerk
for any failure to make such a determination because the Code does
not impose a penalty.
SECTION 9-504. Secured Party's Right to Dispose of Collateral after
Default; Effect of Disposition
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of any or all of the collateral. . . .
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceed-
ings ... and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of
the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must
be commercially reasonable.
Family Finance Corp. v. Scott, 24 D.&C.2d 587 (Pa. 1961).
For a discussion of this case see infra, Section 9-507.
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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SECTION 9-507. Secured Party'i Liability for Failure to Comply
With This Part
(2) .. . If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual
manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current
in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in con-
formity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of
property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. . .
Family Finance Corp. v. Scott, 24 D.&C.2d 587 (Pa. 1961).
Debtor was entitled to have a deficiency judgment opened where a
repossessed automobile was sold for less than one-half of the recognized
wholesale value as quoted by the "Redbook," a national publication
circulated among car dealers. The court held that although speed is
essential in transactions of this nature, nevertheless where sufficient
facts are alleged indicating that bids received by the secured party
did not give any consideration to the condition of the collateral and
there was a wide discrepancy between at least one recognized value in
the trade (the "Redbook" quotation) and the resale price, the debtor
should be given the opportunity to have the transaction examined to
determine the reasonable value of the collateral at the time of resale.
[Annotator's Comment: A prior Pennsylvania decision stated that
there is no recognized market for used cars and that prices quoted in
the "Redbook" are not sell and bid prices, but are merely for the con-
venience of the dealer.2 The instant forum has made a more realistic
appraisal of the situation. The court recognized that the "Redbook"
is not conclusive evidence of the current price obtainable but is a de-
termining factor in fixing the reasonable value of motor vehicle col-
lateral. In view of the fact that most banks, finance companies and
car dealers refer to the "Redbook" as a matter of course when trans-
acting installment loans or in determining trade-in-allowances, the court
was correct in using the publication as a practical yardstick in deciding
whether the secured party has resold in a "commercially reasonable
manner."
Since one of the major criticisms of the secured transactions part
of the Code has been directed at the use of the rather vague standard of
"commercial reasonableness," the decision brings to the Code a much
needed narrowing of the scope of this standard. Further, when one
considers that the Code's liberalizing provisions have all but abandoned
prior restrictions placed on the secured party's right of resale, 3
 the
decision takes on added significance by establishing at least one guide-
post as a protective device for defaulting buyers of collateral sold in
unrecognized markets Al
2 Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 171 A.2d 548 (Pa. 1961). See 3 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 45 et seq. (1961) foi the annotation of this case.
a For a general discussion concerning Article 9, see Gilmore, The Secured
Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 27 (1951).
4 For an interesting comment on remedies on default under Article 9 of the Code,
see Comment, 39 Marq. L. Rev. 246 (1950).
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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[N.B. State variations: Mass. UCC Section 9-507(2) amended
second sentence by adding after "secured party" the words "in good
faith for the purpose of avoiding or reducing loss and of effective reali-
zation." This amendment appears to be mere surplusage as the principal
limitation on the secured party's right to dispose of collateral is the re-
quirement that he proceed in good faith; Section 1-203 sets forth the
good faith principle which runs throughout the Code and which is re-
quired in the performance and enforcement of all agreements and duties.]
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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